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A government which raises taxes in the current period may induce
workers to invest in ﬁnding ways to reduce their tax payments, and
so may reduce the government’s ability to raise revenue in the future.
Therefore, a government that fears it may have to raise much revenue
in the future may set taxes in the current period at a lower level than
that which would maximize revenue, or that would maximize social
welfare in that period.
∗An earlier version of the paper was presented at the conference “Frontiers of taxation”
held at the WZB, Berlin in December 2008.
11 Introduction
In his great budget speech of 1853, the British Chancellor of the Exchequer,
William Gladstone, referred to levying an income tax, which Prime Minister
Pitt had introduced during a war, in 1798-99. Gladstone said:
If you do not destroy the eﬃcacy of [the income tax] it aﬀords
you the means, should unhappily hostilities again break out, of
at once raising your army to 300,000, and your ﬂeet to 100,000,
with all your establishments in proportion. And, much as may be
said of the importance—in which I concur—of an army reserve
and navy reserve, and of having your dockyards and your arsenals
well stored, I say this ﬁscal reserve is no less important; for, if it
be used aright, it is an engine to which you may resort, and with
which, judiciously employed, if unhappily necessity arise—which
may God in his mercy avert!—with it judiciously employed you
may again, if need be, defy the world. This, then, is the purpose
which the income-tax has served—that in a time of vital struggle
it enabled you to raise the income of the country above its expen-
diture of war and civil Government; and that service so performed
was performed at a time when men do not minutely inquire is let
loose, and when whole plains are besmeared with carnage, are
the times when it is desirable that you should have the power of
resort to this mighty engine, to make it again available for the
defence and the salvation of the country.
...I say, therefore, Sir, that if we rightly use the Income-tax, when
we part with it we may look back upon it with some satisfaction,
and may console ourselves for the annoyance it may have entailed,
by the recollection that it has been the means of achieving a great
good, immediately to England, and ultimately to mankind.
This paper formalizes the idea and explore its implications, contributing
to the literature in public ﬁnance, in particular to the analysis of intertem-
poral taxation. I shall consider how tax rates in one period can aﬀect tax
revenue in future periods, showing that a ruler in year y who anticipates
that he may have to raise much revenue in year y +1 may limit the taxes he
levies in year y. For an analogy, consider resistance to antibiotics. It may be
best to withhold an antibiotic from a patient who is moderately ill, because
2a current dose could make the antibiotic less eﬀective were the patient later
to become gravely ill.1
2 Literature
The analysis of intertemporal taxation relates to work by Barro (1979), who
shows why reducing the deadweight loss from taxation requires government
to smooth out taxes over time. The analysis also relates to option value—
delay taking an action today because the future will reveal more information
about what action is best.
Svensson (1988) models the incentives of an incumbent to reduce the
ability of a successor with diﬀerent preferences from raising much tax rev-
enue. In particular, weak property rights push economic activity into the
untaxed sector, thereby reducing the optimal tax level. Svensson (1998) also
reports empirical support for his model, showing that high levels of political
polarization are associated with poor protection of property rights.
3 Assumptions
3.1 State of nature
In period 2 the state of nature is either peace or war, with optimal provision
of a public good higher in war than in peace. Let the probability that the
state of nature will be war be π; with probability 1−π the state of nature will
be peace.2 Though I speak of war and of peace, the interpretation applies to
any states of nature where the beneﬁts of governmental spending diﬀer. So
peace can represent a time without a natural disaster, and war a time with
it. Or, peace can be interpreted as a situation where government spending
on medical research may be unproductive, whereas war is a situation where
scientiﬁc advances make medical research productive.
1The opposite eﬀect, analytically analogous, but not explored here, can occur if govern-
ment better learns how to collect taxes the higher are current taxes—seeing how individuals
evade high taxes in peace time, government may know how to control evasion in war time.
Were such learning powerful, government would raise taxes in peace time in anticipation
of raising taxes even more in war time.
2We can think of π as representing the probability of a regime switch.
3The marginal beneﬁt of government spending is γ up to the quantity qs in
state of nature s, with qp < qw, and is zero for greater levels. The population,
of homogeneous individuals, has size N. To make things interesting, that is
to suppose that taxation is socially worthwhile, Nγ must exceed 1.
The state of nature in period 1 is peace. For simplicity, the intertemporal
discount rate is 0.
I shall suppose that spending must be contemporaneously ﬁnanced by
taxes. An alternative to keeping some tax in reserve for future contingencies
is to borrow when the need arises. The qualitative conclusions continue to
apply if government can borrow in period 1, raising taxes in period 2 to
repay the debt. But the results do require that government cannot continue
to borrow indeﬁnitely or without limit. Borrowing may be especially diﬃcult
during a war: persons who think the country may be invaded will be unwilling
to lend. In any case, the quantities qp and qw can be interpreted as the
gap between what government would spend in a ﬁrst-best solution, and the
amount it can borrow, the gap requiring ﬁnancing by taxation.
3.2 Taxpayers
All individuals are identical. Labor supply by each individual is exogenously
ﬁxed, at 1, which can be employed in either the taxed or the untaxed sector.
Entering the untaxed sector involves a ﬁxed cost, F.3 The marginal product
of labor is higher in the taxed sector than in the untaxed sector. This captures
the ﬁnding that tax evasion varies by source of income, with the largest
category of tax evasion arising from under reporting of business income, with
about 57 percent of income not reported (see Slemrod 2007). Also consistent
with the assumptions is the result by Giles and Caragata (2001) that in New
Zealand an increase in taxes is associated with an increase in the size of the
underground economy.
The wage, or marginal product, in the taxed sector is Yt; the wage in
the untaxed sector is Yu. In a one-period model (say in period 2), a person’s
utility in the taxed sector is (1−t)Yt+γtYt+γG−i, where G−i represents taxes
paid by all persons other than the one in question. To simplify the algebra,
I shall ignore the term γtYt; that is, I shall ignore the beneﬁt an individual
obtains when the taxes he pays increase the provision of the public good. As
long as γ < 1, the qualitative results do not depend on this simpliﬁcation.
3This cost can also be interpreted as a morale cost, as in Frey and Schneider (2000).
4Note also that if γ is small, or if the public good is lumpy (say that a ﬁghter
plane costs $100 million, so that added tax revenues from one person do
not allow government to provide an additional ﬁghter plane), then any one
person’s tax payment may contribute very little to increasing the provision
of the public good.
A person who works in the untaxed sector in period 2, and who had not
invested in tax evasion in period 1, has utility −F + Yu + γG−i. These two
expressions determine the maximum tax rate feasible in period 2. If people
had invested in tax evasion in period 1, then no tax revenue is collected in
period 2.
In the absence of tax evasion, the optimal tax rate in a period with the
state of nature s must satisfy tYt = qs/N.
Note that the question discussed here is not whether a high tax always
reduces revenue. The question is whether anticipation of high taxes induces
investment in tax evasion, and so reduces the tax revenue that could be
collected in the future. Thus, we can suppose that only a fraction f of the
population might engage in tax evasion. Then in peacetime, a tax increase
reduces the tax revenue from a fraction f of the population, and increases
it from a fraction (l − f) of the population, so that aggregate tax revenue
can increase. But in wartime, for any given tax rate (including the revenue-
maximizing one), tax revenue will be less (from the f people) because the
high tax in peacetime induced them to invest in tax evasion.
The timeline follows:
• Government imposes a linear income tax for period 1.
• Each individual invests or not in tax evasion.
• Government collects tax revenue, using it to provide a public good.
• Nature determines the state of nature for period 2.
• Government imposes a linear income tax in period 2.
• An individual who had not previously invested in tax evasion in period
1 now invests or not in tax evasion.
• Government collects tax revenue, spending it on a public good.
54 Optimal taxation
4.1 Period 2
In period 2 the state of nature will be either peace or war. If individuals
invested in tax evasion in period 1, then government collects no revenue in
period 2. If they had not invested in tax evasion in period 1, then the maxi-
mum tax government can collect in period 2 makes an individual indiﬀerent
between working in the taxed and untaxed sectors in period 2. That is,
(1 − t2)Yt = Yu − F, (1)
or
t2 = (Yt − YuF)/Yt. (2)
In contrast, the ﬁrst-best tax rate in state of nature s, absent tax avoidance,
is
ts = qs/(NYt). (3)
4.2 Period 1
To make the problem interesting, suppose that if peace is expected over two






Yt ≥ −F + 2Yu. (4)
Consider next the possibility of war, which occurs in period 2 with probability
π. Then the maximum tax rate in period 1 which would not induce an
individual to invest in tax evasion satisﬁes





(NF + 2N(Yt − Yu) − π(qw − qp) − qp). (6)
Subtracting from this tp yields (NF +2N(Yt −Yu)+π(qp −qw)−qp)/qp,
which for suﬃciently large qw and π is necessarily negative. That is, the
ﬁrst-best tax, tp, in time of peace in period 1 is not feasible: imposing that
6tax would induce an individual to invest in tax evasion in period 1. To avoid
such tax evasion, government must impose a tax that generates less revenue
than qp, or government must provide less of the public good than it would
were tax evasion not a problem. For an extreme example, suppose that when
war is not foreseen, the tax that maximizes social welfare in period 1 is also
the tax that would just avert individuals from investing in tax evasion. Then
any value of π > 0, or any possibility that war would erupt in period 2, would
lead government in period 1 to adopt a tax rate lower than tp; for if it did
set the tax rate at the level that maximizes welfare in one period, individuals
would invest in tax evasion.
5 Extensions
Leviathan How would a Leviathan government, one that aims to maxi-
mize tax revenue, behave? Note that such a government faces a credibility
problem— because in period 2 it would want to maximize tax revenue, set-
ting the tax at that level which makes a taxpayer just avoid evasion, the only
policy the Leviathan government could credibly adopt in period 1 is to set a
zero tax. That is, a revenue-maximizing government will collect less revenue
in the initial period than would a welfare-maximizing government. But, note
that over the two periods, the Leviathan would raise more revenue.
State of war in period 1 A similar analysis applies if the state of nature
in period 1 is war, with π the probability that the state of nature is war in
period 2. Were government to impose a tax of qw/(NYt) in period 1, and with
a positive probability that government will also impose a tax of qw/(NYt) in
period 2, then an individual taxpayer would have an incentive to invest in
tax evasion in period 1. To avoid that, government must impose a tax rate
of less than qw/(NYt) in period 1.
Inﬁnite horizon We can modify the model to consider an inﬁnite horizon.
In any period, the government may choose a tax lower than the tax that
maximizes welfare in any one period, because it fears that it will need high
revenue in the future.
To be explicit, suppose that qp = 0, and so we need only consider spending
in time of war. Let the discount factor be δ. Let the equilibrium tax in time
7of war be tw. Then in time of war the maximum tax rate satisﬁes
(1 − t)Yt + Σ
∞
i=0δ
iπ(1 − tw)Yt = Yu − F. (7)
Setting t = tw gives the solution
tw =
δ(F − πYt + Yt − Yu) − F − Yt + Yu
Yt(δ(1 − π) − 1)
. (8)
Budget surplus The argument presented here argues against raising taxes
in times of low need for public services, with the aim of establishing a “rainy
day fund” that could be used when the need for public services is high.
For the higher taxes in an early period can induce individuals to invest in
tax evasion. An alternative to a rainy day fund is a rainy day tax, that is
a tax, such as Gladstone advocated, which can be imposed in the future.
Relatedly, the logic of this argument suggests that Republicans who want to
cut spending or government revenue may gain little from cutting taxes. The
tax cut makes it easier for Democrats to raise taxes in the future.
This reasoning is consistent with the empirical results reported by Romer
and Romer (2007). They ﬁnd that tax cuts in one period may increase spend-
ing in future periods, and that the main eﬀect of tax cuts on the government
budget is to induce subsequent legislated tax increases.
6 Conclusion
William Gladstone appeared to recognize that tax policy should consider the
needs for tax revenue in the event of a severe, perhaps unlikely, event, such
as a war. In this view, he appears to have discovered some hundred years
before Milton Friedman did the existence of the “Peso Problem.”4
To understand government we must ask not only what taxes government
imposes but also what taxes it does not impose. Furthermore, when ask-
ing whether government is spending too much or too little, we should not
look only at the current period but instead ask how current taxes will aﬀect
future revenues. The problem here resembles the peso problem in ﬁnancial
economics.
In the early 1970s, the exchange rate between the Mexican peso and the
US dollar was ﬁxed, with Mexican banks oﬀering far higher interest rates
4For an exposition of the peso problem, see Sill (2000).
8than US banks. That, said Friedman, is anomalous, since investors had
arbitrage opportunities. If, however, investors feared a future devaluation of
the peso (as indeed happened in 1976), then the current interest rate would
reﬂect the devaluation risk. In other words, large events, even if unlikely, can
strongly aﬀect current events. The same holds for taxation.
97 Notation
F An individual’s cost of entry into untaxed sector
G−i Amount of tax revenue collected from other than person under consid-
eration
N Population size
qs Level of public good with positive beneﬁts in state of nature s
t1 Tax rate in period 1 which makes individual indiﬀerent between investing
and not in tax evasion
ts Tax rate in period 2 when state of nature is s
Yi Pre-tax income in sector i
δ Intertemporal discount factor
γ Marginal value of public good
π Probability that in period 2 state of nature will be war
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